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SAFEGUARDING THE ENEMY WITHIN: THE
NEED FOR PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR
U.S. CITIZENS DETAINED AS ENEMY
COMBATANTS UNDER EX PARTE QUIRIN
Thomas J. Lepri*
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks took the lives of more than
3,000 people in New York City, Washington, D.C., and rural
Pennsylvania.' The federal government reacted swiftly. On
September 18, Congress authorized President George W. Bush "to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determine[d] planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks. ' '2  Two months later,
President Bush issued a military order authorizing the creation of
military tribunals to try non-U.S. citizens who belonged to the al
Qaeda terrorist group and "engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired
to commit" certain acts of terrorism against the United States.' Both
the military order and the September 18 Congressional Authorization
were designed with an eye toward the war in Afghanistan. At the
same time, law enforcement officials were forced to deal with
domestic threats that lacked precedent in recent history. In response
to these threats, a "parallel system" of justice has developed wherein
the government has claimed the authority to detain indefinitely
individuals suspected of terrorist activity, including U.S. citizens, as
"enemy combatants. '4
The most visible application of this doctrine thus far has been the
case of Jose Padilla.5 In early May 2002, the FBI arrested Padilla in
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. A thousand thanks and
much love to my wife, Cressida, and my daughter, Miranda.
1. Death Toll: 3,025 Victims at3 Sites, Seattle Times, Sept. 11,2002, at A6.
2. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224, 224 (2001) [hereinafter Authorization].
3. Military Order-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
4. See Charles Lane, In Terror War, 2nd Track for Suspects; Those Designated
'Combatants' Lose Legal Protections, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 2002, at A01 ("[lit is
different than the criminal procedure system we all know and love. It's a separate
track for people we catch in the war." (quoting a Bush administration official)).
5. See infra Part II.B.
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Chicago at O'Hare International Airport for his alleged participation
in an al Qaeda plot to detonate a radiological bomb in the United
States.' The rough outlines of Padilla's life are well known by now.
An American citizen, Padilla was born in Brooklyn, New York, and
moved to Chicago with his family when he was four years old.7 While
some neighbors knew him as "Pucho," an affable child and good
student,' he became familiar to Chicago law enforcement authorities
in the 1980s as a local gang member, according to government
officials.9 In 1983, when Padilla was twelve years old, a jury convicted
him of murder in Chicago."' He was imprisoned until his eighteenth
birthday." In 1991, he went to prison in Florida on charges of
aggravated assault and firing a handgun. 2 After his release, he began
referring to himself as Ibrahim Padilla and moved to Egypt. 3 His
mother reportedly feared he had joined a cult. 4
According to the government, Padilla afterwards traveled to
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan." In Afghanistan in 2001, he
met with al Qaeda lieutenant Abu Zubaydah, with whom he
developed a plan to build and detonate a radiological bomb in the
United States. The plan allegedly included stealing radioactive
material from within the United States once Padilla had returned.
7
6. See Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, 'Dirty Bomb' Plot Uncovered, U.S. Says;
Suspected Al Qaeda Operative Held as 'Enemy Combatant', Wash. Post, June 11,
2002, at Al; see also Ted Bridis, U.S. Nabs 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect, Associated Press
Newswires, June 10, 2002; Andrew Buncombe, U.S. Stops AI-Qa'ida 'Dirty Bomb'
Attack on Washington, The Independent (London), June 11, 2002, at 1; John
Hendren, Alleged Bomb Plotter to Be Held Indefinitely, Pentagon Says, L.A. Times,
June 11, 2002, at A18; Donna Leinwand & Jack Kelley, U.S.: 'Dirty Bomb' Plot
Foiled, USA Today, June 11, 2002, at IA; James Risen & Philip Shenon, Traces of
Terror: The Investigation; U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb,
N.Y. Times, June 11, 2002, at Al; Roland Watson & James Doran, AI-Qaeda's 'Dirty
Bomb' Plotter Held, Times (London), June 11, 2002, at 19.
7. Robert C. Herguth et al., Former Chicagoan 'Trained with the Enemy,' U.S.
Says, Chicago Sun-Times, June 10, 2002, at 3.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, The Amended
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at app. 2, Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-4445) [hereinafter Government Brief]. But see Caroline
Daniel & Jeremy Grant, Ex-gang member who went unnoticed, Fin. Times (London),
June 11, 2002, at 3 (stating Chicago police have no record of Padilla).
10. Government Brief, supra note 9, app. at 2. News reports following Padilla's
detention put his age at 31. See, e.g., Herguth, supra note 7, at 3. Thus, if these figures
are accurate, in 1983, at the time of his conviction, Padilla would have been 12 or 13
years old.
11. Government Brief, supra note 9, app. at 2.
12. Id.; see also Herguth, supra note 7, at 3.
13. Government Brief, supra note 9, app. at 2. Subsequent to Padilla's moving to
Egypt in 1998, he became known as Abdullah Al Muhajir, according to the Mobbs
Declaration. Id.
14. Herguth, supra note 7, at 3.




Federal agents arrested Padilla immediately upon his arrival in
Chicago on May 8, 2002." The U.S. Marshals Service held him as a
material witness in a grand jury investigation 9 until June 9, when he
was transferred to a Charleston, South Carolina, Navy brig, where he
has remained without access to counsel and without being formally
charged z.2  The government has justified curtailing Padilla's Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights by declaring him an "enemy combatant," a
term that has lain dormant in the United States judicial system for the
last sixty years, and whose meaning is extremely unclear.2' Under the
enemy combatants doctrine, the government claims the right to detain
U.S. citizens indefinitely without charging them.
This Note addresses the government's application of the enemy
combatants doctrine to detain suspected terrorists. Part I explores the
judicial origins of the term "enemy combatants" and its cognate in
international law, "unlawful combatants. ' 22 Part I also examines the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as an example of a
congressional attempt to provide detailed procedural safeguards
against executive abuse in national security matters.23  Part II
discusses the main questions posed by two recent enemy combatant
cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 4 and Padilla v. Bush25 : What procedural
protections should suspected enemy combatants have, and by what
standard should the government's determination that an individual is
an enemy combatant be reviewed? Part II also discusses the benefits
and pitfalls of the clear alternative to enemy combatant detentions:
affording suspects the full protections of the normal rules of civil
procedure.26 Finally, Part II examines civilian trials, such as the trials
of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing conspirators and the 1998
embassy bombers.27 Part III proposes a set of procedural safeguards
to the unsettled questions presented by Hamdi and Padilla.2" It does
so by using the law of war and the procedures codified in the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act as models. Detainees, this part argues,
should have rights in accordance with those models, including the
18. Id. app. at 4.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Editorial, The Right to Counsel, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 2003, at A22
(noting Padilla has been held in the South Carolina brig since June 2002); Benjamin
Weiser, U.S. Asks Judge to Deny Terror Suspect Access to Lawyer, Saying It Could
Harm Interrogation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2003, at All (noting Padilla is one of two
U.S. citizens held since September 11, 2001, without being formally charged); see also
infra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part 1; see also notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 33-81 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 82-106 and accompanying text.
24. 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003): see also infra notes 109-46 and accompanying
text.
25. 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also infra notes 147-65.
26. See infra notes 169-90 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 191-210 and accompanying text.
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right to a fair hearing, the right to counsel, and the right to sue in tort
for unlawful detentions. Moreover, this Note concludes that the
government should be required to justify detentions by a showing of
probable cause.29
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ENEMY COMBATANTS DOCTRINE
Nobody knows the exact definition of an enemy combatant. The
term first appeared in Ex parte Quirin,"' a case in which the Supreme
Court upheld the government's authority to prosecute eight Nazi
saboteurs in a military court." It seems to derive from the term
"unlawful combatants," a label long used in international law to help
distinguish between conventional and unconventional prisoners of
war. 2 Section A of this part describes the brief and murky history of
the term "enemy combatants" in American courts. Section B
discusses how its cognate, "unlawful combatants," has functioned with
far greater precision in international law. Finally, Section C will
introduce the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as an example of a
statutory response to the same problem presented by Quirin-the
problem of national security-in the area of wiretapping.
A. Judicial Origins of the Enemy Combatants Doctrine in Ex Parte
Quirin
Quirin is the cornerstone of the enemy combatants doctrine. The
handful of subsequent Supreme Court decisions invoking Quirin have
developed this doctrine little, if at all.33 Unfortunately, the doctrine
produced by Quirin itself is hazy and highly fact-specific.
Quirin involved eight German-born men, all of whom had lived in
the United States at some point, and one of whom was believed to be
a naturalized American citizen. 4 The men had attended a Berlin
sabotage school and received training in the use of explosives." They
29. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
30. 317 U.S. I (1942) (holding an unlawful enemy belligerent may be tried by
military tribunal).
31. For a discussion of Quirin within its historical context, see Michal R. Belknap,
The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur
Case, 89 Mil. L. Rev. 59 (198)).
32. See infra notes 58-81 and accompanying text.
33. "Handful" is not an underestimation. Between 1942 and 2002, the Supreme
Court had occasion to cite Quirin and the enemy combatants doctrine a total of two
times. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 355 (1952) (upholding the jurisdiction of
American occupation military tribunal that convicted petitioner of murder in the
American Zone of Germany): In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1946) (denying
petition for habeas corpus of a Japanese general and finding that the military
commission that tried him for war crimes had authority to do so)- see also United
States v. Schultz, 4 C.M.R. 104, 113 (1952) (upholding the jurisdiction of the
American military tribunal in Japan that convicted petitioner of negligent homicide).
34. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20.
35. Id. at 21.
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traveled clandestinely to the United States via submarine with the
mission of destroying transportation facilities and key elements of the
American aluminum industry.36 Four of these men landed via
submarine at Amagansett, Long Island, on the night of June 12,
1942."7 The four others landed days later at Ponte Verde Beach,
Florida.3" All the men alighted wearing German military uniforms,
but they buried their uniforms and explosives upon landing and
dispersed to various parts of the country in civilian clothes. 9 By June
27, FBI agents had taken all eight men into custody in New York and
Chicago.4 )
The Federal Bureau of Investigation quickly publicized these
arrests to a public hungry for positive news on the war in Europe.41
President Roosevelt ordered that the saboteurs be tried by a military
court, and he issued a proclamation on July 2 declaring that anyone
acting under the direction of hostile foreign powers was within the
jurisdiction of military tribunals. 42 On July 8, a military commission
convened in secret to try the saboteurs.43
36. Belknap, supra note 31, at 62.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
40. Belknap, supra note 31, at 62.
41. Id. The circumstances surrounding FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's
announcement of the capture of the saboteurs bears some resemblance to the mood
in June, 2002, when Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the detention of
Padilla. See Ashcroft Text, Associated Press Newswires, June 10, 2002. Bush
Administration officials, who had come under fire for failing to recognize clues
leading up to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, stressed that
Padilla's arrest was the product of cooperation between federal agencies like the FBI
and the CIA. See id. (noting that "[b]ecause of the close cooperation among the FBI,
the CIA, Defense Department and other federal agencies, [the government was] able
to thwart this terrorist"); see also Eggen & Schmidt, supra note 6. Some observers
noted that Padilla's detention was fortuitously timed considering the Congressional
inquiry into the government's intelligence lapses. See, e.g., Patrick E. Tyler, Al-Qaida
Menace Very Much Alive, S. Fla. Sun-Sentinel, June 11,2002, at 12A.
Monday's disclosure may well galvanize Americans once again behind the
president and the notion that the country remains at war even as Congress
carries forward with its review of U.S. intelligence failures that allowed
Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida cohorts to catch the country napping on
Sept. 11 .... Since Congress began its inquiry into intelligence lapses, the
White House has pursued a more muscular strategy to demonstrate it is
moving aggressively to deal with the ongoing threats.
Id.
42. See Belknap, supra note 31, at 65 (citing Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation
Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States, Exhibit B, Ex
parte Quirin, July Special Term- 1942, Ex parte and Miscellaneous Case Files, 1925-
1953, Records of the Supreme Court of the United States, Record Group 267,
National Archives).
43. Id. at 66. Belknap argues that while the preservation of national security was
the conventional explanation for excluding the public and press, there were also less
flattering reasons why federal authorities would have wanted the proceedings to take
place in secret. Id. at 66-67. These reasons included the fact that the quick capture of
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On July 29, the Supreme Court agreed to gather for a special
session to hear the saboteurs' habeas petitions.44 The case was argued
for nine hours on July 29 and July 30." The weightiest argument
made by the defense was the applicability of the Court's decision
eighty years earlier in Ex parte Milligan.4" In Milligan, the Court
struck down the government's attempted use of a military tribunal to
try an American citizen during the Civil War. 7 Milligan involved an
Indiana resident arrested in his home state and put on trial before a
military commission on charges that included conspiracy against the
government, inciting insurrection, and violating the laws of war.4" The
Milligan Court stated that military tribunals could not be used to try
"citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the government,
and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed."4
The Quirin Court was not swayed. Less than twenty-four hours
after arguments concluded, it issued a per curiam opinion stating that
the petitioners had failed to show cause for discharge by writ of
the eight men was due not to any investigative work by the FBI, but to the betrayal of
his comrades by George John Dasch, the leader of the four-man team that landed in
Amagansett. Convinced that he would be captured after being sighted by the Coast
Guard, Dasch initially telephoned the FBI, then traveled to Washington on his own,
where he made a full confession. Id. at 65. Another potential embarrassment for the
FBI was its treatment of Dasch's initial call as a crank call. Id. at 67. Trial testimony
revealed that FBI officials had told Dasch they would arrange for a presidential
pardon if he pleaded guilty and did not testify about his participation in his own
apprehension. Id. at 67 (citing E. Rachlis, They Came to Kill 143-45, 150-55, 198-200
(1961); Wash. Post, June 29, 1942, at 6; N.Y. Times, June 29, 1942, at 4, and July 7,
1942, at 7).
44. Belknap, supra note 31, at 69.
45. Id. at 75.
46. 1I. at 73; Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
47. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 2. Milligan fits within a long history of domestic military
tribunals in the United States, a history that ended shortly after Quirin and the end of
World War 11. See Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administration's
Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 433, 452-79 (2002)
[hereinafter Balknap Pedigree]. Belknap describes the record of injustice produced
by such trials as the Dakota War Trials, where the Union condemned to death more
than 300 Dakota Sioux Indians during the Civil War; the 1863 conviction of Clement
L. Vallandigham, a pro-Southern Democrat who was openly critical of the Lincoln
Administration's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, for violating a military
order making it illegal to declare sympathy for the enemy; the 1865 trial of eight
civilians accused of conspiring with John Wilkes Booth to assassinate Lincoln(Belknap notes that this trial would have been "clearly unconstitutional had Milligan
been decided a year earlier"); and the 1865 conviction and execution of Captain
Henry Wirz for murdering and conspiring to injure POWs, crimes allegedly
committed as commander of a Confederate POW camp. Id; see also Ex parte
Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 243, 249 (1863); Benn Pitman, The Assassination of
President Lincoln and the Trial of the Conspirators (1974); Carol Chomsky, The
United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 13
(1990); Lewis L. Laska & James M. Smith, 'Hell and the Devil': Andersonville and the
Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, C.S.A., 1865,68 Mil. L. Rev. 77 (1975).
48. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 6.
49. Id. at 121.
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habeas corpus.' The military trial of the saboteurs ended the next
day, and a few days later, the commission found all defendants guilty
and sentenced them to death.5' Six of the defendants in Quirin had
already been executed by the time the Quirin Court issued its full
opinion.52
In its opinion, the Court distinguished the facts of Quirin from
Milligan. It reasoned that the Milligan Court had found that Milligan
''was not an enemy belligerent either entitled to the status of a
prisoner of war or subject to the penalties imposed upon unlawful
belligerents. '53  Identified as an implied exception to Milligan's
general rule, the concept of "enemy combatants" thus became the
dispositive factor in the Quirin Court's analysis.
Importantly, the Quirin Court tied its definition of enemy
combatants very closely to these facts. It wrote:
[E]nemy combatant[s] who without uniform [come] secretly through
the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or
property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally
deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be
offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals.
54
We can quickly identify three elements in this analysis: An enemy
combatant is a belligerent who (1) does not wear a uniform, (2)
secretly passes through the lines of battle, and (3) does so during
wartime. These elements fit neatly with the facts of Quirin. First, the
eight defendants had abandoned their German Marine Infantry
uniforms upon arriving in the United States. Second, they arrived
clandestinely "during the hours of darkness. '55 Third, the saboteurs
took these actions in the context of the United States' formal
declaration of war against Germany, on whose behalf they brought
explosives "for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or
property. " '51
These elements constitute the bulk of the doctrine on enemy
combatants that arises from Quirin. They represent the full extent of
the Supreme Court's efforts to define the term "enemy combatant. '57
For a more functional understanding of the term, one must look to
international military law.
50. Belknap, supra note 31, at 76.
51. Id. at 77.
52. Id.
53. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,45 (1942).
54. Id. at 31.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Id. at 31.
57. See infra text accompanying note 166.
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B. "Unlawful Combatants" in the Law of War
The term "enemy combatants" seems to have derived from
"unlawful combatants," a term that, although not included in the 1949
Geneva Conventions, has long been recognized in international
military law. 51 Unlike the uncertainty surrounding enemy combatants,
there is general agreement about what unlawful combatants are and
how they should be treated. Unlawful combatants are combatants
who directly join in hostilities outside the limits imposed by the
international law of armed conflict. 59 They include persons who have
"fallen into the power of the enemy" yet fail to meet the four criteria
necessary for prisoner-of-war status."' First, prisoners of war must
have been "commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates."'" Second, they must have worn a uniform, or have "a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance."' 2 Third, they must
have carried arms openly."' Lastly, they must have conducted "their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war."64
Persons not meeting all four of these criteria do not enjoy prisoner-of-
war status.65
This does not necessarily mean, however, that persons who fail to
meet these criteria are automatically and immediately considered
unlawful combatants. Article 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War provides that in cases of "any
doubt," captured combatants should be given the opportunity for a
hearing before a tribunal.) Under the law of war, then, the United
58. See, e.g., A. Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War 64 (1976) (noting the
attitude during the French and American Revolutionary Wars that "persons taking
part in hostilities with no authorization from the state ... were not entitled to be
treated as lawful combatants and prisoners of war").
59. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of








66. Geneva Convention, supra note 59, art. 5 (emphasis added). Article 5 states:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any
of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the
protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.
Id. However, the government, in its brief in the Padilla case, ignored the rights of
detainees to Article 5 status hearings, arguing instead that the law of war confers no
due process rights upon detainees.
There has never been an obligation under the laws and customs of war to
charge an enemy combatant with an offense .... Nor is there any general
right of access to counsel for enemy combatants under the laws and customs
of war. Even the Third Geneva Convention -which does not afford any
2572 [Vol. 71
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States must give detainees in an armed conflict a hearing to determine
their status under the Geneva Convention in cases where their status
appears to be even slightly uncertain.
This provision establishes a bulwark against the old practice of
making Article 5 determinations arbitrarily and without scrutiny.
Detainees automatically enjoy prisoner-of-war status "until such time
as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
6 7
Therefore, Article 5 creates what is effectively a presumption of
innocence on the part of the detainee. Moreover, the power to
determine whether "any doubt" exists as to the status of a detainee
does not lie solely with the military. Article 45(1.) of the 1977 Protocol
I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides that a detainee is
presumed a prisoner of war if, among other things, "he claims the
status of prisoner of war."6 Article 5 thus codifies in the law of war a
detainee's right to argue in his own defense.
Article 5 also provides for the establishment of "competent
tribunals" to hear status disputes, although it does not specify the
composition of a "competent tribunal," or what procedures it should
follow. ' 9 Generally speaking, this silence is not a serious problem in
conventional armed conflicts, where distinguishing between lawful
and unlawful combatants is not a very complicated matter. In a
conventional war, most prisoners taken are uniformed, carrying arms,
and part of a group under the immediate command of a single
officer.7" Thus, an informal and ad hoc procedure for classifying
lawful and enemy combatants is less problematic in a conventional
conflict than in one where, for example, one side does not wear
uniforms. American forces in World War II made Article 5 status
determinations in the following manner: Typically, persons of low
rank were responsible for making determinations that a detainee was
not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, and these determinations were
usually made with little deliberation.71 Such an informal classification
protections to unlawful enemy combatants like the detainee in this case-
confers no right to counsel to prisoners of war for challenging their wartime
detention, but provides counsel only in the event that formal charges are
initiated in a trial proceeding.
Government Brief, supra note 9, at 23 n. 6 (citations omitted). One wonders what a
"lawful enemy combatant" might be in the domestic context.
67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
68. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),
Dec. 12, 1977, art. 45, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1411 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); see also
Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict 56 n.202 (Naval
War College Int'l Law Stud. No. 59, 1977).
69. See id. at 55-56.
70. See George H. Aldrich, New Life for the Laws of War, 75 Am. J. Int'l. L. 764,
768-69 (1981) (arguing that Article 4's requirements were written in contemplation of
full-time soldiers in a conventional war, not guerilla combatants).
71. The rights of detainees to a status hearing were not recognized by the previous
Convention. See Levie, supra note 68, at 55. Article 5 of the 1949 Convention
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procedure, imported by analogy to the domestic setting by the
contemporaneous Quirin Court, may have worked in its context. But
an irregular conflict such as the "War on Terror" demands something
much more formal.
Vietnam was such an irregular conflict. There, the Army faced the
problem of how to make POW status determinations in an
unconventional war that made the Article 5 threshold of "any doubt"
seem much lower than it did in World War 11.72 The Army responded
by issuing a directive laying out a procedure for status hearings. 73
The directive provided that when a detainee had committed a
belligerent act, he would be referred to an Article 5 tribunal if (a) any
doubt about his status existed or (b) the detainee or someone on his
behalf claimed the detainee deserved POW status despite a
determination that the detainee was not a POW.74  The tribunal
consisted of at least three officers, a majority of whom must have
voted in favor of denying POW status for the detainee to lose that
status.7 5 The detainee himself had a number of rights. He had the
right to a competent interpreter, a right to present his case with the
help of counsel, and the right to be present with his counsel at open
sessions of the tribunal.76
The detainee had the right to select as counsel "anyone reasonably
available, including a fellow detainee. ' 77  If no counsel were
reasonably available, the tribunal would appoint "a judge advocate or
other military lawyer familiar with the Geneva Conventions as
counsel" for him.7 ' The detainee's counsel could present a range of
evidence: affidavits, real evidence, documents, and statements of the
detainee himself.79 He could call and cross-examine witnesses."' He
had free access to visit and interview the detainee in private, and also
to confer privately with "essential witnesses," including POWs."
The international law of war, then, provides detailed procedures for
making determinations about the status of unlawful combatants. It
represents the drafters' attempt to introduce greater formality to this process. Id. at
55-56.
72. See Levie, supra note 68, at 57 (describing "the problem of the need to have a
formalized procedure for deciding the doubtful cases of entitlement to prisoner-of-
war status of individuals captured by [U.S.] forces").
73. United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Directive 20-5,
Mar. 15, 1968, Prisoners of War-Determination of Eligibility, reprinted in 62 Amer. J.
Int'l L. 768-76 (1968).
74. Id. at 768-69.
75. Id. at 771.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 772.
79. Id. at 773.
80. Id. at 772. The right to call and cross-examine witnesses was subject to "such




also includes safeguards to ensure status determinations are not made
unilaterally without regard for detainees' ability to argue on their
behalf, either on their own or through counsel. In comparison, the
judicial doctrine on enemy combatants is sparse and undeveloped.
Judicial doctrine is not the only way the law regarding executive
powers in situations involving national security has developed, of
course. This law may also take statutory form, as it has in the area of
wiretapping. Part C will show how, in contrast to the confusion
surrounding enemy combatants, the law regarding electronic
surveillance in situations involving national security is extremely
detailed.
C. Electronic Surveillance Law Compared
Wiretapping law was not always highly developed. Indeed, it was
once as murky as the enemy combatants doctrine. Before Congress
passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, s2 wiretapping was effectively unregulated. In 1928, the Supreme
Court in Olmstead v. United States held that the Fourth Amendment's
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures did not apply
to electronic eavesdropping."3 Government wiretapping continued
essentially without restrictions for the next forty years." It was not
until 1967 that the Supreme Court held in Katz v. United States that
wiretaps were "searches" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and consequently that the government must meet the
Constitution's warrant and probable cause requirements when
conducting electronic surveillance." Nevertheless, the Court
specifically declined to extend its holding to cases involving national
security."
82. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2522 (2000)).
83. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding electronic
wiretapping not subject to Fourth Amendment).
84. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 made it a crime to intercept and
divulge or publish the contents of wire and radio transmissions. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)
(2000). The Supreme Court, in Nardone v. United States, held that evidence obtained
by the government through wiretapping was inadmissible in court. 302 U.S. 379
(1937). However, the Justice Department interpreted Nardone and the Federal
Communications Act as merely prohibiting the publication of the contents of
interceptions outside the federal government. Senate Select Comm. to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book
11, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976),
quoted in Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1977, S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 10 (1977) [hereinafter Senate Report], reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3911. Thus the practice of unfettered electronic surveillance was
continued by the Roosevelt Administration and subsequent administrations. Id.
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a
warrantless government recording of defendant's conversation in an enclosed public
phone booth).
86. Id. at 358 n. 23 ("Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a
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A year later, Congress enacted Title I1, the first federal statute to
regulate wiretapping in criminal investigations.17  Title III provided
that the government must meet a twofold probable-cause standard to
obtain a wiretap in a criminal investigation: (1) probable cause to
believe the individual targets of surveillance are committing one of
the crimes listed in the statute, and (2) probable cause that the
telephone or facility the government wants to tap is being used in
connection with that criminal activity, and that the wiretap will yield
"communications concerning" the activity." To obtain a wiretapping
warrant under Title Il1, the government must also show that other
investigative procedures, such as the use of informants, are not likely
to work.9'
Following Katz's lead, Title IIl explicitly exempted from its
coverage the government's foreign intelligence gathering activities."
However, demand for restrictions on the wiretapping authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency and Executive branch took root amidst
the widespread public distrust engendered by the Watergate scandal.92
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national
security is a question not presented by this case.").
87. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b), (d).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) ("[N]ormal investigative procedures have been tried
and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous."). The government must also meet a "minimization" requirement by
which wiretapping warrants are conditioned on the government's agreement to tune
out non-relevant conversations. "Every order and extension thereof shall contain a
provision that the authorization to intercept ... shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception .... " 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5).
91. Title II states:
Nothing contained in this chapter or chapter 121, or section 705 of the
Communications Act of 1934, shall be deemed to affect the acquisition by
the United States Government of foreign intelligence information from
international or foreign communications, or foreign intelligence activities
conducted in accordance with otherwise applicable Federal law ....
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f).
92. See, e.g., Joseph Fromm, Reform of the CIA - What It Really Boils Down To,
U.S. News & World Report, May 10, 1976, at 23 (discussing findings of a report by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities) ("The Senate reports says, 'The
Committee's fundamental conclusion is that intelligence activities have underminded
[sic] the constitutional rights of citizens and that they have done so primarily because
checks and balances designed by the framers of the Constitution to assure
accountability have not applied."'); It's Official. Government Snooping Has Been
Going On for 50 Years, U.S. News & World Report, May 24, 1976, at 66 (discussing
findings of a report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities).
In its final report, the Committee said wiretapping and bugging have
"provided the Government with vital intelligence." But it warned, they also
can provide "vast amounts of information, unrelated to any legitimate
governmental interest, about large numbers of American citizens." And, it
concluded: "The very intrusiveness of these technicques [sic] implies the
need for strict controls on their use."
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In 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities published a harshly
critical report on the government's use of electronic surveillance. 93
The Committee compiled a litany of abuses of executive power,
including President Franklin D. Roosevelt's authorization of wiretaps
of "persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government
of the United States," and Attorney General Robert Kennedy's
wiretapping of news reporters, Malcolm X, and the Rev. Martin
Luther King, Jr. 4 In 1978, responding to the perceived need to curb
such executive abuses, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA").95
The foreign intelligence version of Title III, FISA uses a probable
cause standard that is more relaxed than that of Title III. Under
FISA, agents must make a showing that there is probable cause that
the target of surveillance is a "foreign power" or an agent of a foreign
power.9 In cases involving U.S. citizens, the government must show
that the target is acting for or on behalf of a foreign power, or is aiding
or conspiring with any person acting for or on behalf of a foreign
power. 7 Unlike Title III, FISA does not require a showing of
criminal activity on the part of the target unless the target is an
Id.
93. The Committee wrote:
Since the 1930's, intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped and
bugged American citizens without the benefit of judicial warrant .... [Phast
subjects of these surveillances have included a United States Congressman,
Congressional staff member, journalists and newsmen, and numerous
individuals and groups who engaged in no criminal activity and who posed
no genuine threat to the national security, such as two White House
domestic affairs advisers and an anti-Vietnam War protest group.
The application of vague and elastic standards for wiretapping and
bugging has resulted in electronic surveillances which, by any objective
measure, were improper and seriously infringed the Fourth Amendment
Rights of both the targets and those with whom the targets communicated.
The inherently intrusive nature of electronic surveillance, moreover, has
enabled the Government to generate vast amounts of information-
unrelated to any legitimate government interest-about the personal and
political lives of American citizens. The collection of this type of
information has, in turn, raised the danger of its use for partisan political and
other improper ends by senior administration officials.
Senate Report, supra note 84, at 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3909
(citations omitted).
94. See It's Official: Government Snooping Has Been Going On for 50 Years,
supra note 92, at 66.
95. See Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§
1801-1811 (2000)).
96. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(A) (agent must produce facts to justify the belief that
the surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power); id. §
1805(a)(3)(A) (reviewing judge must find there is probable cause to believe the
surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power).
97. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A)-(E).
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American citizen suspected of spying for a foreign power; in those
cases the government must only show the target's activities "may
involve" a violation of U.S. criminal law.9"
In applications for FISA warrants, the government must also certify
that a significant "purpose of the surveillance" is "to obtain foreign
intelligence information,"99  and that this information "cannot
reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques.''"' The
government must also include its basis for these certifications."' It
must state how long it will need to maintain surveillance,")2 and if it
wants to continue surveillance indefinitely, the government must
produce facts supporting its belief that it will obtain additional
information of the same type as the information it seeks
immediately.'( 3 Surveillance applications are reviewed by the FISA
court, made up of eleven federal district court judges nominated by
the Chief Justice of the United States." 4 By statute, the FISA court
cannot approve the government's request unless it finds probable
cause supporting the government's belief that the surveillance target
"is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." 1
5
Unlike the law regarding physical detentions of enemy combatants
within the U.S., which has remained murky and undeveloped over the
last fifty years, the law regarding electronic surveillance for foreign-
intelligence gathering purposes is clear. As opposed to Quirin's
enemy combatants doctrine, FISA provides a detailed set of
procedural safeguards. These safeguards are designed to curb abuse
of executive power without hampering the government's ability to
conduct wiretaps in national security cases."'
98. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A) (defining as an agent of a foreign power any U.S. citizen
who "knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on
behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal statutes of the United States").
99. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(B). Section 218 of the Patriot Act amended FISA to provide
that "foreign intelligence" need only be a "significant purpose" of investigations. The
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001). The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review,
assembling for the first time, ruled that the FISA court and Justice Department's
previous understanding that the purpose of the investigation need be the "primary"
purpose was an incorrect reading of the FISA statute itself. In re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Rev. 2002). See also Neil A. Lewis,
Court Overturns Limits on Wiretaps to Combat Terror, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 2002, at
1.
100. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(C).
101. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(E).
102. Id. § 1804(a)(10).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 1803(a).
105. Id. § 1804(a)(4)(A).
106. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; Part III.B.
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Difficult questions arise in the case of enemy combatant detainees.
How long may the government hold suspects without charging them?
May detainees have access to counsel or the right to a hearing? Is the
government's determination that an individual is an enemy combatant
reviewable by courts? If it is, by what standard? Part II explores the
ways two contemporary cases have raised, and largely failed to
answer, these questions.
II. QUIRIN RESURRECTED IN HAMDI V. RUMSFELD AND PADILLA V.
BUSH
Compare the situation of an enemy belligerent detained in South
Vietnam with that of an enemy combatant detainee such as Jose
Padilla. For more than nine months, Padilla has been held
incommunicado, with no access to counsel, or, for that matter, access
to anyone."" He has not been charged with a crime, and the
government has given him no status hearing. The distinction is
clear-a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant has significantly
fewer rights than a hostile enemy belligerent captured in foreign
territory by U.S. troops during an armed conflict.
The rights of enemy combatant detainees will be settled in
upcoming litigation. Padilla v. Bush". and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld' 9 are
parallel enemy combatants cases, one of which may well become the
first "enemy combatants" case to reach the Supreme Court in sixty
years.'""' If the government succeeds in its use of this undefined term
to detain U.S. citizens indefinitely, it will have a weapon of extremely
broad reach.
A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: A Circular Trap
Like Padilla, Yaser Esam Hamdi is a U.S. citizen."' American and
allied forces captured Hamdi in Afghanistan as part of the military
operation authorized by Congress" 2 following the attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001."'
American troops transferred Hamdi in the fall of 2001 to Camp X-
Ray in Guantanomo Bay, Cuba, where he was held along with other
107. See Editorial, supra note 20.
108. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
109. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
110. Hamdi's lawyer, federal public defender Frank Dunham, has indicated his
plans to appeal the decision. Jess Bravin, Court Upholds Indefinite Jailing of U.S.-
Turncoat Combatants, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 2003, at A4 ("'Since I can't talk to my client
and give him a chance to decide whether to appeal, I think I have to do everything in
my power to protect his rights,' [Dunham] said.").
111. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
government believes Hamdi has retained his U.S. citizenship).
112. See Authorization, supra note 2: see also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying
text.
113. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 280.
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prisoners captured in the Afghanistan conflict.' 4  In January 2002,
when it became clear that he had been born in Louisiana, and was
therefore a U.S. citizen, authorities brought Hamdi to the Norfolk
Naval Station Brig, where the government sought -to detain him
indefinitely as an enemy combatant.' 15
Hamdi's father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of his son." 6 The trial court appointed the
Federal Public Defender as counsel.'17  The court also granted the
Public Defender access to Hamdi in a meeting that would be "private
between Hamdi, the attorney, and the interpreter, without military
personnel present, and without any listening or recording devices of
any kind being employed in any way."' " Moreover, the meeting was
to occur at least three days before the government filed its response to
Hamdi's brief."9
On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded. 12 In reaching its decision, the Hamdi court focused on
what it saw as the exceptional circumstances that made the order
unlike the "garden-variety appointment of counsel in an ordinary
criminal case," a decision that would have been well within the
discretion of a trial court.'2 ' The Fourth Circuit focused on Hamdi's
characterization as an enemy combatant:
There is little indication ... that the [district] court gave proper
weight to national security concerns. The peremptory nature of the
proceedings stands in contrast to the significance of the issues before
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 279. Prior to this filing by Hamdi's father, the Federal Public Defender
for the Eastern District of Virginia had filed a habeas petition naming himself as a
"next friend" of Hamdi. Id. The district court granted the Public Defender's request
to meet with Hamdi privately and without being monitored by the government. Id.
However, the Fourth Circuit reversed this order in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598
(2002). The Fourth Circuit held that the Public Defender failed to meet the two-
pronged test from Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990). Under Whitmore, a
next friend must first supply an explanation why the real party in interest cannot
prosecute the action on his own behalf. Id. at 163. Second, a next friend must show
that he is "truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks
to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a 'next friend' must have some
significant relationship with the real party in interest." Id. at 163-64 (citations
omitted). While the Hamdi court was satisfied that the petition met the first
criterion- Hamdi's detention rendered him inaccessible-it found that the second
criterion was lacking, because the Public Defender had no prior relationship with
Hamdi before he filed a habeas writ on his behalf. Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 604. To put
Hamdi's treatment of the next-friend issue into a broader context, see Stacey M.
Studnicki & John P. Apol, Witness Detention and Intimidation: The History and
Future of Material Witness Law, 76 St. John's L. Rev. 483, 524-27 (2002).
117. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 281.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 279.
121. Id. at 282.
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the court. The June 11 order does not consider what effect
petitioner's unmonitored access to counsel might have upon the
government's ongoing gathering of intelligence. The order does not
ask to what extent federal courts are permitted to review military
judgments of combatant status. Indeed, the order does not mention
the term enemy combatant at all.
Instead, the June 11 order apparently assumes (1) that Hamdi is
not an enemy combatant or (2) even if he might be such a person, he
is nonetheless entitled not only to counsel but to immediate and
unmonitored access thereto. 22
The Fourth Circuit also noted that because the trial court had allowed
Hamdi to meet with his lawyer before the government had an
opportunity to present its arguments, the order failed to create "even
a modest foundation" for review at the appellate level. 123
On remand, the district court held a hearing in which it asked the
government a series of fundamental questions about the nature of the
hostilities pursuant to which Hamdi was being detained. 124 Relating to
the indefinite nature of the detention, the court asked, "will the war
never be over as long as there is any member [or] any person who
might feel that they want to attack the United States of America or
the citizens of the United States of America?' ' 25 The court directed
the government to answer these questions in a response to Hamdi's
petition. 126 The government filed a response that included an affidavit
from Michael Mobbs, the Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy.127 The Mobbs declaration confirmed that the
government had declared Hamdi to be an "enemy combatant," and
gave the government's account of Hamdi's seizure12' and his
subsequent transfers to Camp X-Ray and the Norfolk Navy brig. 29
The district court then held a hearing to review the sufficiency of the
Mobbs declaration. 130
122. Id.
123. Id. at 282-83.




128. The court wrote:
According to Mobbs, the military determined that Hamdi 'traveled to
Afghanistan in approximately July or August of 2001' and proceeded to
'affiliate[] with a Taliban military unit and receive[] weapons training.' While
serving with the Taliban in the wake of September 11, he was captured when
his Taliban unit surrendered to Northern Alliance forces with which it had
been engaged in battle. He was in possession of an AK-47 rifle at the time
of surrender.
Id. (alterations in original).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 462.
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At this hearing, the district court noted, in accordance with the
Fourth Circuit's instructions,"' that "the government is entitled to
considerable deference in detention decisions during hostilities."'32
Nonetheless, it issued an opinion finding that the Mobbs declaration
fell "far short" of supporting the detention, and ordered the
government to turn over a list of materials to supplement its response
to Hamdi's petition.'33  These materials included copies of all
statements by Hamdi and the notes taken from all interviews with
him; a list of every person who had interrogated Hamdi; copies of any
statements made by Northern Alliance members regarding Hamdi's
surrender; "the name and title of the individual within the United
States Government who made the determination that Hamdi was an
illegal enemy combatant"; and the screening criteria that the
government used to determine Hamdi's status.'34
The government again appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which
reversed the district court's order and remanded the case with
directions to dismiss Hamdi's petition.'35 In its opinion, the Fourth
Circuit rejected Hamdi's argument that he was entitled to an Article 5
status hearing.'36 It reasoned that the Geneva Convention is not a
"self-executing"' 37 document that evinces an intent to provide a
private right of action to individual petitioners. 3 ' Moreover, the court
wrote, even though unlawful combatants are entitled to a status
hearing, "they are also subject to mere detention in precisely the same
way that lawful prisoners of war are.""'' The Fourth Circuit's
rationale for rejecting the district court's order, meanwhile, focused
on the practical problems that the order posed to the government in
the context of an ongoing military campaign.""
The court based its decision to dismiss Hamdi's petition on the level
of extreme deference 4' due to the President's exercise of his powers
131. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
132. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 462.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 470.
135. Id. at 459.
136. See supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text
137. "Non-self-executing" treaties require implementing legislation to be given
effect in United States courts. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 111(3) (1997). Such implementing legislation may be required
by the language of the treaty itself, the Senate in giving consent to a treaty or the
House of Representatives by resolution, or the Constitution. Id. § 111 (4)(a)-(c).
138. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468.
139. Id. at 469. "The fact that Hamdi might be an unlawful combatant in no way
means that the executive is required to inflict every consequence of that status on
him. The Geneva Convention certainly does not require such treatment." Id.
140. Id. at 469-71. "The factual inquiry upon which Hamdi would lead us, if it did
not entail disclosure of sensitive intelligence, might require an excavation of facts
buried under the rubble of war. The cost of such an inquiry in terms of the efficiency
and morale of American forces cannot be disregarded." Id. at 471.
141. The court did not reach the question of whether the "some evidence" standard
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as Commander-in-Chief in time of war. 142 The court described a two-
pronged inquiry: First, the government must have the legal authority
to detain Hamdi; and second, the government must have supplied
basic facts necessary to support a legitimate use of that authority.
1 43
The Fourth Circuit found both prongs satisfied, the legal authority
stemming from Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the source of
the President's war powers,144 and the necessary factual support
supplied by the Mobbs Declaration. 145  Of the district court's close
scrutinizing of the declaration, the court wrote:
To be sure, a capable attorney could challenge the hearsay nature
of the Mobbs declaration and probe each and every paragraph for
incompleteness and inconsistency ... [But] [w]e are not here dealing
with a defendant who has been indicted on criminal charges in the
exercise of the executive's law enforcement powers. We are dealing
with the executive's assertion of its power to detain under the war
powers of Article 11. 146
The Fourth Circuit's application of Quirin, then, leaves Hamdi
stuck within the circular trap created by the enemy combatants
doctrine: The determination that he is an enemy combatant denies
him the means-a capable attorney-of challenging that very
determination.
B. Padilla v. Bush: No Guidance from Quirin
On December 4, 2002, Judge Michael Mukasey of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that Jose Padilla
must be allowed to meet with an attorney-a right the government
had denied him for some six months after transferring him to a naval
brig in South Carolina.147  The Court also ruled that it had the
authority to determine whether the government's classification of
Padilla as an enemy combatant was proper.14' However, because the
district court narrowly tailored its ruling to the circumstances of
Padilla's habeas petition, it left open some of the most fundamental
questions about the rights of enemy combatants, such as whether all
detainees should have such procedural protections as the right to a
fair hearing and access to counsel.
of review sought by the government applied. Id. at 474.
142. Id. at 471-72; accord Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,25 (1942).
143. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468.
144. U.S. Const., art. I1, § 2; Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 471.
145. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 473.
146. Id. at 473.
147. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See also Larry
Neumeister, Judge: Court Can Decide Whether Dirty-Bomb Suspect Is Enemy
Combatant, Associated Press Newswires, Dec. 4, 2002. As of this writing, Padilla still
had not met with his attorney. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
148. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08.
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In its brief in the Padilla case, the government responded to each of
Padilla's constitutional challenges under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments in the same manner: by pointing to his status as an
enemy combatant.' For example, Padilla's invocation of the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement, the government argued,
presupposes that the warrant requirement applies in the first place.""
But the warrant requirement does not apply "in the context of the
capture and detention of an enemy combatant in the field of war." '
This reasoning has an obvious appeal to the government. An
executive determination that a citizen is an enemy combatant is
immune to all constitutional challenges because that determination
places that citizen outside the purview of the Constitution itself.
The district court decided to allow Padilla to present facts through
counsel, but based that decision narrowly on the facts of Padilla's
case. 52 Rather than looking to the Sixth Amendment rights of enemy
combatant detainees in general, Judge Mukasey based his decision on
the rights of a petitioner in a habeas proceeding.'53 These rights, the
court noted, sprang from the statute granting federal district courts
the authority to issue habeas writs, and two related statutes outlining
procedural guidelines for habeas proceedings.'54 The court rejected
Padilla's Sixth Amendment argument on the grounds that the
President's executive determination that Padilla is an enemy
combatant placed him outside the protections of the Sixth
Amendment. 5' However, it took care to note that Padilla's right to
149. Government Brief, supra note 9, at 17, 21-27.
150. Id. at 26.
151. Id.
152. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599-605.
153. Id. at 599.
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) (granting district courts, inter alia, the power to
issue writs of habeas corpus); 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (outlining procedures to be followed in
a § 2241 case); 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (allowing presentation of evidence in habeas cases by
deposition, affidavit, or interrogatories). See also Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600
("Quite plainly, Congress intended that a § 2241 petitioner would be able to place
facts, and issues of fact, before the reviewing court, and it would frustrate the purpose
of the remedy to prevent him from doing so.").
155. The Sixth Amendment states that in criminal prosecutions, "the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const.,
amend. VI. The Padilla court wrote:
Of course, Padilla has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in this
proceeding. The Sixth Amendment grants that right to the "accused" in a
"criminal proceeding"; Padilla is in the custody of the Department of
Defense; there is no "criminal proceeding" in which Padilla is detained;
therefore, the Sixth Amendment does not speak to Padilla's situation.
Beyond the plain language of the Amendment, "even in the civilian
community a proceeding which may result in deprivation of liberty is
nonetheless not a 'criminal proceeding' within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment if there are elements about it which sufficiently distinguish it
from a traditional civilian criminal trial."
See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600 (citations omitted).
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counsel hinged largely on the peculiar facts of his case, which it
distinguished from those in Harndi, where the Fourth Circuit had
reversed a district court's grant of unmonitored access to counsel.1
56
In Padilla, the district court stressed that the government could
monitor Padilla's conversations with his lawyers. 57 Additionally, the
court noted that unlike Hamdi, Padilla had been granted access to
counsel during his initial detention on a material witness warrant
before the government designated him an enemy combatant.
5 1
Therefore, the court reasoned, "no potentia! prophylactic effect of an
order barring access by counsel could have been lost" by granting
access to counsel.' 59
Perhaps most importantly, the district court accepted the very
deferential standard of review for enemy combatant determinations
sought by the government.'" In its brief, the government had argued
156. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 604.
157. Id. at 603-04.
158. Id. at 605.
159. Id. In a subsequent filing asking Judge Mukasey to reconsider his decision to
allow Padilla access to counsel, the Justice Department disclosed that military
interrogators had been questioning Padilla for several months in an attempt to turn
him into a valuable source of intelligence about al Qacda. Lyle Denniston, U.S.
Argues Against Counsel for Terror Suspects, Boston Globe, Jan. 11, 2003, at A2.
"Without reporting the details of the questioning, and without discussing anything
that Padilla may have said in those sessions, the department said that 'granting him
direct access to counsel can be expected to set back his interrogations by months, if
not derail the process permanently." Id. Without more information, one may
reasonably assume that the government expects the effectiveness of these
interrogations to correspond with their unconventionality and harshness. Using a
particularly telling phrase, the government argued that allowing Padilla direct contact
with an attorney threatened to upset "the sense of dependency and trust" created by
interrogators. Id. (citations omitted).
Judge Mukasey responded with a biting opinion reaffirming his decision to
allow Padilla to meet with defense lawyers. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, No. 02-4445, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3471 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2003). Mukasey wrote that his order was
"not a suggestion or a request that Padilla be permitted to consult with counsel, and is
certainly not an invitation to conduct a further 'dialogue' about whether he will be
permitted to do so. It is a ruling-a determination-that he will be permitted to do so."
Id. at 35. The government subsequently told the court that it would seek an expedited
appeal of the order. Benjamin Weiser, A Nation at War. The Courts U.S. to Appeal
Order Giving Lawyers Access to Detainee, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 2003, at B15. The
government claimed that the court, "in a district far from the Charleston brig, lacked
jurisdiction in the matter." Id.
160. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605-10. The government, in its brief in the Padilla
case, argued for the "some evidence" standard that the Supreme Court has applied to
habeas challenges to such executive determinations as deportation orders, selective
service determinations, and extradition orders. Government Brief, supra note 9, at 14-
16. Regarding deportation orders, the government cited INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
306 (2001), where the Court wrote:
Until the enactment of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, the
sole means by which an alien could test the legality of his or her deportation
order was by bringing a habeas corpus action in district court. In such cases,
other than the question whether there was some evidence to support the
order, the courts generally did not review factual determinations made by
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for a standard of review barely more rigorous than no review at all: 6'
"[Rieview is limited to confirming based on some evidence the
existence of a factual basis supporting the determination.' 62
Accepting the government's separation-of-powers argument that a
court's ability to review executive decisions is limited,'63 the district
the Executive.
Government Brief, supra note 9, at 14-15. Regarding selective service
determinations, the government quoted Eagles v. United States, 329 U.S. 304, 312
(1946), where the Court wrote: "If it cannot be said that there were procedural
irregularities of such a nature or magnitude as to render the hearing unfair, or that
there was no evidence to support the order, the inquiry is at an end." Government
Brief, supra note 9, at 15. Notably, the Eagles Court invoked procedural safeguards
that do not exist in enemy combatants detentions.
According to the government, because courts used such a deferential standard
"in contexts much less constitutionally sensitive than the one" in the Padilla case, they
should be no less deferent when reviewing executive determinations of great
importance to national security. Id. at 14. Of course, the opposite argument also
follows: Because detentions of enemy combatants involve a fundamental right of U.S.
citizens-the right to liberty-a much less deferential standard than those regularly
used to review decisions of administrative agencies should apply.
161. Cases the government relied upon in its argument for judicial deference in the
Padilla case included Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) ("Certainly it is
not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation-even by a citizen-
which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-
Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region."); Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942) ("An important incident to the conduct of war is the
adoption of measures by the military command ... to seize and subject to disciplinary
measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort
have violated the law of war."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S.
304, 319 (1936) (holding federal power over foreign affairs is entrusted to the
President alone); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862) (stating the Court
must "be governed by" the Executive branch with respect to "[w]hether the President
in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met
with such armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will
compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents."); and Able v. United
States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cir. 1998) ("In the military setting... constitutionally-
mandated deference to military assessments and judgments gives the judiciary far less
scope to scrutinize the reasons, legitimate on their face, that the military had
advanced to justify its actions."). Government Brief, supra note 9, at 11-13.
162. Government Brief, supra note 9, at 13 (emphasis added).
163. The Padilla court quoted at length the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Harndi to
this effect:
[T]he Supreme Court has shown great deference to the political branches
when called upon to decide cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign
policy, national security, or military affairs. This deference extends to
military designations of individuals as enemy combatants in times of active
hostilities, as well as to their detention after capture on the field of battle.
The authority to capture those who take up arms against America belongs to
the Commander in Chief under Article II, Section 2. As far back as the Civil
War, the Supreme Court deferred to the President's determination that
those in rebellion had the status of belligerents. And in World War 11, the
Court stated in no uncertain terms that the President's wartime detention
decisions are to be accorded great deference from the courts.
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (quoting Harndi v. Rinisfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 282 (4th
Cir. 2002) (citations omitted)).
ENEMY COMBA TANTS
court wrote that it would apply the deferential "some evidence" test
once Padilla had presented facts in his favor."6 It is likely, however,
that any facts Padilla might present will have little effect, because the
standard of review does not seem to allow for any sort of weighing of
evidence.1 5 Rather, it would seem there either is or is not "some
evidence" to support a determination-contrary evidence
notwithstanding.
Significantly, the district court did not attempt to specify what an
enemy combatant is. On the contrary, it plainly noted the lack of case
law on the subject. "[I]t would be a mistake," the court wrote, "to
create the impression that there is a lush and vibrant jurisprudence
governing these matters. There isn't. Quirin offers no guidance
regarding the standard to be applied in making the threshold
determination that a habeas corpus petitioner is an unlawful
combatant."'66 Given this lack of guidance, it is safe to say that courts
will continue to have difficulty analyzing enemy combatants
determinations made by the government. The vagueness of the term
"enemy combatants" and the extremely deferential standard of review
sought by the government and accepted by the district court in Padilla
may well transform judicial review of enemy combatant
determinations into rubber-stampings of detentions.
Moreover, whatever analysis courts attempt will likely be
hamstrung by the difficult task of construing Quirin in a post-
September 11 context.6 7 Quirin's discussion of enemy combatants
164. Id. at 608.
165. Even the highly deferential "substantial evidence" standard used by courts to
review administrative findings involves some consideration of the quality of evidence.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2000) (establishing substantial evidence standard of judicial
review in cases "subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute"). Courts have interpreted 5
U.S.C. § 706's substantial evidence standard as a qualitative standard that includes
consideration of evidence supporting conclusions contrary to those drawn by the
administrative agency whose decision is under review. See, e.g., Nibali v. United
States, 589 F.2d 514, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (stating that, when determining substantiality
of evidence, court must take into account whatever in record detracts from its
weight); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied 338 U.S. 860 (1949) (stating substantial evidence includes more than a mere
scintilla of evidence and more than uncorroborated hearsay).
166. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
167. For one thing, the Supreme Court decided Quirin in accordance with
contemporary jurisprudence. Since that case, the Court has vastly increased
protections for individuals accused of crimes, most notably in the context of searches
and seizures, confessions, and the right to counsel. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (holding that a suspect in custodial interrogation must be made aware of
his right to assistance of counsel and to terminate questioning); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal defendants are
entitled to have counsel appointed for them in state court proceedings under the Sixth
Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding the exclusionary rule
barring admission of evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment
applicable to the states). A wholesale importing of Quirin's reasoning into today's
setting would ignore the significant developments in the Court's understanding of
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was rooted in the context of a conventional war very unlike the
United States' current anti-terrorism program. Unlike a conventional
war, a "war on terror" does not engage hostile governments with
defined borders. This conflict, as the Bush Administration has
repeatedly noted over the last year, may extend indefinitely as an
ongoing national security effort. In this context, an uncritical
importing of Quirin might support the government's authority to
detain citizens as enemy combatants for years on end with very little
scrutiny by courts. Without a set of procedural safeguards-including
a detainee's right to present facts through counsel and a probable-
cause standard which the government must satisfy to justify
detentions-the category of "enemy combatants" may become a
juggernaut for the government.
C. Flawed Alternatives
This is not to say that the government does not have very real
concerns. A war on terror is unlike a conventional war. But terrorism
is also unlike conventional crime, and it poses very different
challenges to both law enforcement and the military. These
challenges complicate the viability of the clear alternative to the
government's use of military tribunals and the enemy combatants
individual rights in constitutional criminal law over the last sixty years. Professors
Neil K. Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe made this argument in Waging War, Deciding
Guilt: 'Frying the Military Tribunals, Ill Yale L.J. 1259 (2002). They wrote:
We do not believe these decisions necessarily have full applicability in
otherwise constitutional military tribunals ... but they do suggest that the
constitutional landscape has changed so significantly since World War 11 that
a precedent like Quirin ... is more plausibly classified with those decisions
like Korernatsu, whose force as precedent has been diminished by
subsequent events, rather than with those whose undiminished momentum
counsels maintenance under principles of stare decisis (like Roe v. Wade).
Id. at 1304.
168. How well-suited are the principles of Quirin today'? Recall the three elements
the Quirin Court used to describe the "familiar example" of a belligerent to be
classified as an enemy combatant. An enemy combatant is a belligerent who (I) does
not wear a uniform and (2) secretly passes through the lines of battle (3) during
wartime. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
These elements do not square well with Padilla's case. Padilla, it is true, had
no uniform, but neither do most American citizens. Someone who does not wear a
uniform is not the same as a belligerent who does wear a uniform but abandons it to
slip behind enemy lines. Padilla did not, as did the German belligerents in Quirin,
come secretly through enemy lines in the darkness of night, or at any other hour, for
that matter. He came openly on a commercial airliner. Government Brief, supra note
9, app. at 2.
Most obviously, the concept of "enemy lines" itself has at best tenuous
applicability to Padilla. For the first nine months of Padilla's detention, the United
States was not engaged in anything resembling a formal war with any nation. During
that period, it also lacked a formal enerny in any form that could have been
anticipated by the Quirin Court.
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doctrine: civilian courts applying the normal rules of criminal
procedure.
1. The Problem of Secrecy
The most common objection to giving suspected terrorists the full
constitutional protection of civilian courts Hinges on the issue of
secrecy.' 9 Granting suspects unfettered access to counsel may allow
them to pass coded information to other operatives on the outside.""
According to the government, access to counsel also may "interfere
with-and likely thwart-the efforts of the United States military to
gather and evaluate intelligence about the enemy, its assets, its plans,
and its supporters.""'' This logic relies on the notion that one of the
main functions of counsel is to clamp down on the government's
aggressive questioning of criminal suspects, and it is likely correct-
that is, a competent attorney will thwart the sort of unconstitutional
interrogation techniques that the government might be tempted to use
against a suspect it believes has information that could save lives."'7
Proponents of military tribunals also point to the problem of
classified or sensitive information, which, for security reasons,
prosecutors may be reluctant to present as evidence in a civilian trial.
In the embassy bombing trial,' 73 for example, prosecutors entered into
evidence a 180-page translated document entitled "Military Studies in
the Jihad Against the Tyrants."'74 This document instructed readers
on the use of rifles and pistols for assassinations, on the endurance of
torture, and on encryption methods; and gave guidelines for renting
safe houses and storing illegal weapons.'75 Supporters of military
tribunals have blasted the publicizing of this "terror manual" in open
court. 7"' As one Wall Street Journal editorial put it: "By entering the
manual into evidence, the U.S. was telling al Qaeda that it knew its
operating procedures and inviting it to change course. This was bad
enough during peacetime, but in the middle of a war against terrorism
it's akin to disclosing troop movements."' 77
169. See, e.g., Terrorists on Trial. Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at A 18.
170. See Benjamin Weiser, Threats and Responses: Suspect "Enemy Combatant"
Fights to Obtain Counsel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 2002, at A17 (describing opposing
briefs filed in the district court in the Padilla case). "A lawyer could also become an
unwitting conduit for transmitting information that could damage national security,
the government said." Id.
171. Government Brief, supra note 9, at 24.
172. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
173. United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
174. See Prosecutors Put a How-To-Be-A- Terrorist Guide in Their Evidence
Arsenal, Associated Press Newswires, April 5, 2001.
175. See id.; see also Roy Gutman, Training in Terror, Newsweek Web Exclusive,
Oct. 26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24139039: Terrorists on Trial, supra note 169.




The trial of Zacarias Moussaoui also illustrates the difficulties
prosecutors face in this setting. During his trial in federal district
court, Moussaoui demanded and received access to an al Jazeera
television interview with Ramzi bin al Shibh, a Yemeni who
prosecutors believe helped organize the September 11 attacks.1 7' This
development has put prosecutors in a serious bind. Moussaoui's right
to access witnesses who could help prove his innocence, guaranteed
under the Sixth Amendment,1 79 has led his lawyers to demand that
four senior al Qaeda leaders in American custody, including bin al
Shibh and alleged September 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, be called to testify at his trial.""' Judge Leonie M.
Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia has ordered the
government to provide Moussaoui with access to bin al Shibh, but
indefinitely postponed the trial while the government appeals the
order to the Fourth Circuit."8 ' The government has indicated that if it
loses this appeal, it will likely scuttle the trial altogether and try
Moussaoui in military court.'8 2
2. Fairness
The question of fairness with regard to defendants goes hand in
hand with concerns about secrecy. Leaks plagued the trial of the 1993
178. Philip Shenon, Court Papers Show Moussaoui Seeks Access to Captured Al
Qaeda Members, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2002, at 20.
179. U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor...").
180. Philip Shenon, A Nation at War: the Terror Suspect; Man Charged in Sept. /1
Attacks Demands That Qaeda Leaders Testify, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2003, at B12.
181. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2003) (granting
in part and denying in part government's motion for stay). See also Philip Shenon,
Threats and Responses: The Terror Suspect; Judge Grants the Government a Delay of
Moussaoui's Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 2003, at A21.
182. Shenon, supra note 180. It should be noted that civilian trials have returned a
number of key convictions-for example, those of Sheik Omar Rahman, convicted for
his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Wadih el-Hage, convicted of
bombing the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. See United States v. Bin Laden,
126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. Rahman, 854 F. Supp. 254
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). See also Kenneth Anderson, The Military Tribunal Order: What to
do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military
Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,
25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 591, 607-08; James Orenstein, Rooting Out Terrorists Just
Became Harder, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2001, at A35. However, the burdens that civilian
courts place on prosecutors may render the government unable to pursue what it
claims is the main thrust of its anti-terrorism activities: preventing terrorism before it
happens. This fear seems to be supported by the Clinton administration's refusal in
1996 to take Osama bin Laden into custody from Sudan because U.S. prosecutors
lacked sufficient evidence to indict bin Laden in an American court. See Barton
Gellman, U.S. Was Foiled Multiple Times in Efforts to Capture Bin Laden or Have
Him Killed; Sudan's Offer to Arrest Militant Fell Through after Saudis Said No, Wash.
Post, Oct. 3, 2001, at Al.
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World Trade Center bombers" 3 from the onset, possibly prejudicing
potential jurors against the defendants, according to defense
attorneys. 114  Gag orders may ameliorate this problem somewhat.
However, relying on gag orders in matters of national security may
carry serious risks, especially because such orders are often ineffective
or overturned. In the World Trade Center case, for example, Judge
Kevin Thomas Duffy issued a sweeping gag order barring attorneys
from making statements to the press that might prejudice potential
jurors.' Despite that order, prejudicial documents were leaked to
reporters before introduction as evidence, including hundreds of
pages of transcripts from telephone surveillance conducted by an FBI
informant. 6 The Second Circuit eventually overturned Judge Duffy's
gag order as unconstitutionally broad.8 7
Proponents of military tribunals may also argue that the problem of
leaks undermines the argument that defendants would necessarily
receive fairer treatment in civilian courts than in military tribunals.
Empirical evidence suggests, however, that the notion that military
tribunals serve as little more than rubber stamps for prosecutors may
be vastly overstated. While military commissions convicted around
85% of the more than 3000 people tried before them since World War
I,188 the conviction rate for civilians tried on criminal charges in the
Southern District of New York in 2001 was 97.2%, including guilty
pleas and dispositions at trial. 9
The question of how the government and courts should approach
the issue of enemy combatants requires a delicate balancing act, then.
At the extremes sit two sets of unsatisfactory alternatives. On the one
183. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming defendants'
convictions and remanding for resentencing).
184. See, e.g., Larry McShane, Leaks Hurting Five Suspects in Bombing, Lawyers
Say, Associated Press, April 4, 1993. "'It seems to be a systematic effort by the
government to convince America they've caught the right people,' complained
[attorney Robert] Precht, who represents accused bomber Mohammed Salameh of
Jersey City, N.J." Id. "'That refrain is a constant one heard from defense counsel,'
said Richard Winfield, a New York lawyer who represents The Associated Press and
other media." Id.
185. "'The next time I pick up a paper and see a quotation from any of you, you
had better be prepared to pay some money,' Duffy said. The first fine would be $200,
the second $4,000, the third $160,000, the fourth $25.6 million, and so on." Laurie C.
Merrill, September Trial Set in Blast; U.S. Judge Imposes Gag Order, Threatens Fines,
Bergen Record, Apr. 2, 1993, at A3.
186. See, e.g., Peter Pringle, Tapes Reveal Role of FBI in Bombing, The
Independent (London), Nov. 9, 1993, at 15.
187. United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1993) (vacating order
prohibiting attorneys from making statements that "have anything to do with [the]
case" or that even "may have something to do with the case" as overbroad (emphasis
omitted)).
188. John P. Elwood, Prosecuting the War on Terrorism: The Government's
Position on Attorney-Client Monitoring, Detainees, and Military Tribunals, 17 Crim.




hand, giving enemy combatants the full protection of the normal rules
of criminal procedure may, as the government claims, unduly
jeopardize continuing intelligence gathering efforts. On the other
hand, the harsh application of the enemy combatants doctrine by
executive power may create a perverse system in which individuals
lose basic constitutional rights if the government's case against them is
too weak to yield charges.'" Clearly, the government needs a set of
procedural safeguards that provide a framework to guard against
executive abuse but still allow broad counter-terrorism authority.
Ill. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT
To find an example of such a framework, one need only look to the
requirements set out in FISA l9' governing electronic eavesdropping
on U.S. citizens. FISA is itself regarded by critics as a draconian
measure carried out in such extreme secrecy as to raise serious Fourth
Amendment concerns."l2 Yet FISA contains precisely the sort of
procedural guidelines and safeguards that are necessary to curb
executive abuse-safeguards that, although minimal, the government
has sought to avoid in the Hamdi and Padilla cases.
A. FISA's Baseline Protections
In cases involving electronic surveillance of "United States
persons," the government's application for wiretapping authority
under FISA must include a statement of the facts and circumstances
that justify the government's belief that the surveillance target is "a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."' 3 The application
must certify that the purpose of the wiretap is the gathering of foreign
intelligence information9 4 and that normal investigative techniques
will not be sufficient to obtain this information.'95 The government's
application must also include its factual basis for these certifications.'
The question of duration is of particular relevance to enemy
combatants detentions. In FISA applications, the government must
190. If the evidence were stronger, we can assume the government would, in many
cases at least, simply prosecute such suspects.
191. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000).
192. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Oversight Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of .lustice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, H.R., 98th Cong. 27 (1983) (statement of' Mark Lynch, Attorney, ACLU)
("Our principal problem with FISA is that we simply do not know whether it is
working well or badly because of the extraordinary secrecy which cloaks the
operations of the relevant Executive Branch agencies and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.") [hereinafter Hearings[.
193. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(A); see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
195. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B), (C): see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
196. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(E): see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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estimate the time it will need to maintain a wiretap.'97 If it wants to
continue a wiretap indefinitely, it must produce specific facts that
support its belief that an open-ended time frame is necessary. The
standard the government must meet is whether an indefinite time
frame will produce additional information of the same type as the
information it presently seeks.9'9
B. The Probable Cause Standard and the Ticking Bomb Scenario
FISA's probable cause standard creates an important safeguard
against abuse that does not unreasonably interfere with the
government's intelligence gathering activity. Recall that the Act
provides that the FISA court, which is in charge of reviewing
surveillance applications, cannot approve the government's request
for a wiretap unless it finds probable cause exists to believe that the
surveillance target "is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power." 99 The statute generally does not require the government to
show any criminal activity by the wiretap target, except for wiretaps of
American citizens suspected of spying for a foreign power, in which
case the government must show that the activities of the target "may
involve" a violation of U.S. criminal law.2'...
This standard has hardly hampered the government's ability to
conduct surveillance. Because the FISA court operates in extreme
secrecy, having issued just one opinion in its twenty-five years of
operation, complying with the statute's requirements has never
compromised any classified foreign intelligence information.?"
Moreover, the FISA Court approved all 932 of the Justice
Department's requests for intelligence warrants in 2001 alone,21 2 and
has only denied one request since its inception over twenty years
ago. 20
3
197. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(l0); see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
198. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(10).
199. 1i. § 1803(a)(4)(A).
200. Id. § 1801 (b)(2)(A); see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
201. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Rev. 2002).
202. Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Acts to Use New Powers to Spy on Possible Terrorists,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 2002, at Al.
203. Marcia Coyle, Sharp Debate on Surveillance Law: Pick Between Two Little
Words Makes a Big Difference, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 8, 2001, at Al (citing the Center for
Democracy and Technology); see also Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA
Patriot Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement Upon the Privacy of Americans in
the Name of "Intelligence" Investigations, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1651, 1666-72 (2002). But
see Hearings, supra note 192, at 16 (statement of Mary C. Lawton, Counsel for
Intelligence Policy, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice)
(arguing that the government's consistent approval of FISA applications is indicative




Perhaps the most compelling objection to a probable cause
requirement is the hypothetical "ticking bomb" scenario. The phrase
"ticking bomb" refers to a scenario in which investigators have
credible intelligence about the existence of an imminent threat-
usually, as the phrase implies an explosive device-that will take the
lives of many civilians unless defused by government authorities. The
conventional application of this hypothetical involves the situation
where government agents have in custody a suspected terrorist but do
not know the bomb's location. Some commentators have concluded
that the use of torture is justified in such situations.?4 A more general
use of the ticking bomb hypothetical, however, has achieved
prominence in public discourse about the government's anti-terrorism
activities.2 5  Its application to the issue of enemy combatant
detentions contemplates a situation where investigators have
information that a given suspect will soon cause civilian deaths, but
lack sufficient cause or time to detain the suspect through the normal
rules of the criminal justice system. Should these investigators be
powerless to take the necessary action to prevent civilian deaths? To
many Americans, after the World Trade Center attacks of 2001, such
a result seems anathema.
However, the ticking bomb scenario presents a false dilemma.
Courts have developed the exigent circumstances doctrine to deal
with precisely such a situation in the Fourth Amendment setting.
Although the Supreme Court has held that searches made without a
204. Alan Dershowitz has argued for the use of so-called "torture warrants" in
ticking bomb cases, a legal process by which authorities could obtain a judicial order
to subject detainees to non-lethal torture. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism
Works: Understanding the Threat and Responding to the Challenge 131-63 (2002).
Dershowitz writes:
I soon discovered that virtually no one was willing to take the "purist"
position against torture in the ticking bomb case: namely, that the ticking
bomb must be permitted to explode and kill dozens of civilians, even if this
disaster could be prevented by subjecting the captured terrorist to nonlethal
torture and forcing him to disclose its location .... If the reason you permit
nonlethal torture is based on the ticking bomb case, why not limit it
exclusively to that compelling but rare situation'? Moreover, if you believe
that nonlethal torture is justifiable in the ticking bomb case, why not require
advance judicial approval-a "torture warrant."?
Id. at 140-41.
205. Most famously, in his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush used
the ticking-bomb metaphor to justify the United States' response to the attacks of
September 11. Bush told Americans that "[tlhousands of dangerous killers, schooled
in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread
throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning." George
W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 29, 2002), 38 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 133, 134 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/0l/20020129-1 1.html; see also, e.g.,
David Rudge, Targeted Killing-Effective Anti-Terror or Counterproductive?,
Jerusalem Post, Jan. 7, 2003, at 2 (quoting source on the propriety of Israel's practice
of assassinating suspected terrorists "to prevent an immediate threat to innocent life
in the case of so-called ticking bombs").
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warrant are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment,2116 this principle softens in exceptional situations where
exigent circumstances justify the warrantless entry of government
agents. Similarly, in the national security context, FISA specifically
outlines procedures for exigent circumstances. FISA allows the
Attorney General to approve surveillance for twenty-four hours
without a FISA court order if he or she reasonably finds that some
emergency exists that prevents the government from obtaining a FISA
court order, and that the factual basis that would have been needed to
procure an order is present.1
Certainly government agents should have similar emergency powers
to take a U.S. citizen into custody when they have good reason to
believe that citizen poses an imminent and grave threat to national
security. But they should not be allowed to do so without fear of
scrutiny. In recognition of the importance of the need for some
constraints on governmental discretion, FISA provides for criminal
sanctions against persons either engaging in unauthorized surveillance
or knowingly disclosing or using information obtained through such
surveillance.29  FISA also creates a private right of action against
violators, including both actual and punitive damages.2"" Similar
constraints should be placed on government agents involved in the
detention of enemy combatants.
C. Probable Cause and Enemy Combatants
Probable cause is most likely not too high a standard for enemy
combatant detentions. This is the standard of grand jury trials, where
prosecutors enjoy a phenomenally high success rate of indictments.
Statistics published annually by the Department of Justice routinely
show grand jury dismissal rates below 1%.211 Prosecutors have
compiled these records while seeking indictments in cases where
national security is not at risk. One would think that this success rate
would not be diminished when the government possesses an interest
as compelling as national security.
In cases such as Padilla's, the government should be forced to show
probable cause to continue detentions indefinitely. The declaration of
206. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
207. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980) (citation omitted).
208. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (2000).
209. Id. § 1809.
210. 1d. § 1810. Assuming a good deal of FISA surveillance is never detected by the
targets of the surveillance, it seems reasonable to expect a great deal more litigation
over the issue of unlawful detention of citizens as enemy combatants, where the
detainee can hardly be expected to be unaware of his wrongful detention.
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Michael H. Mobbs,21 2 however, attached to the government's brief in
the Padilla case to support the determination that Padilla is an enemy
combatant, suggests Padilla's extended detention may be
unwarranted. The declaration explained that Padilla's connection to
al Qaeda was based largely on reports of interviews with several
confidential sources, two of whom the government believes have
direct connections to the al Qaeda network."3 It also acknowledged
that "[s]ome information provided by the sources remains
uncorroborated and may be part of an effort to mislead or confuse
U.S. officials. 21
4
Upon his release from prison in 1991, Padilla took the name
Ibrahim Padilla, according to the Mobbs Declaration.1 5 Padilla
moved to Egypt in 1998, and afterwards traveled to Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and Afghanistan.2 ' In Afghanistan in 2001 he met with al
Qaeda lieutenant Abu Zubaydah, with whom he developed a plan to
build and detonate a radiological bomb in the United States.2" 7 The
Declaration alleges that Padilla also met with other senior al Qaeda
members in Pakistan in 2000.28 It does not claim that the threat to the
United States posed by Padilla was in any way imminent. The
declaration noted, "The 'dirty bomb' plan of Padilla and [Abu
Zubaydah] allegedly was still in the initial planning stages, and there
was no specific time set for the operation to occur." 219 The plan
allegedly included stealing radioactive material from within the
United States once Padilla had returned, 221 but federal agents arrested
Padilla immediately upon his arrival in Chicago.221 Moreover, one
intelligence official described the research that Padilla conducted
regarding the building of a dirty bomb as consisting of "basically
surfing the Internet. '222 Furthermore, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz told reporters that "there was not an actual plan. We
stopped this man in the initial planning stages. 223
Even if the government could satisfy a probable cause standard to
support Padilla's detention, as long as Padilla remains confined
without benefit of something approximating an Article 5 status
hearing, doubts will linger. The Mobbs Declaration raises as many
212. Appointed by President Bush, Mobbs heads the Detainee Policy Group for
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Government Brief, supra note 9, app. at 1.
213. Id. at 2 n.1.
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questions as it answers, and the questions it raises suggest that
Padilla's status crosses the low threshold that a detainee need pass in
order to secure a hearing under the law of war: the existence of "any
doubt" about the detainee's status.
CONCLUSION
The government often curtails individual rights during armed
conflicts, and courts have often been unwilling to curb the government
as long as those conflicts persist. Milligan was safely decided more
than a year after the Civil War had ended.224 The Court validated the
internment of Japanese Americans in 1944,225 but two years later, the
hysteria of wartime having passed, it invalidated the imposition of a
martial law regime in Hawaii.226 Quirin, too, was very much a product
of its time. In the words of Chief Justice William Rehnquist:
It is worth noting that this decision was made in the dark days of
the summer of 1942, when the fortunes of war of the United States
were just beginning to recover from their lowest ebb. The United
States Navy had suffered serious damage to its fleet at Pearl Harbor,
and Japanese troops invading the Philippines had pushed the United
States troops back onto the Bataan Peninsula, resulting in the grisly
Bataan death march. In North Africa, German forces had
recaptured Tobruck and were within striking distance of Cairo,
threatening the entire Mid East. Civil liberties were not high on
anyone's agenda, including that of judges.2 27
One could say the same for the post-September 11 climate in
America.
The dismal history of civil liberties in wartime underscores the
importance of guaranteeing basic rights. Citizens detained as enemy
combatants should have the right to a hearing that approximates an
Article 5 status hearing. They should have the right to competent
counsel, to present evidence, and to cross-examine key witnesses.
These hearings should use a probable cause standard. As under
FISA, lengthy or indeterminate detentions should be subject to a
renewal procedure wherein the government must show the continued
existence of cause to hold the suspect. Lastly, detainees should have
recourse to civil liability in cases of unlawful detention.
224. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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failure to report for relocation).
226. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (holding that the Governor of
Hawaii lacked congressional and constitutional authorization, under Milligan, to
declare martial law and displace civilian courts with military tribunals).
227. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the 100th Anniversary Celebration of the
Norfolk and Portsmouth Bar Association, Norfolk, Virginia (May 3, 2000), available
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Such safeguards would not render this process entirely safe from
government overreaching. Indeed, turning enemy combatant
detentions into a routine administrative procedure similar to
obtaining FISA warrants would be a truly harrowing scenario for civil
libertarians. But the use of the enemy combatants doctrine to hold
U.S. citizens indefinitely in military custody while civilian "courts are
open and their process unobstructed ' '28 threatens to effect a more
drastic departure from the rule in Milligan than the Quirin Court ever
imagined. A workable set of procedural safeguards can soften this
departure, allowing the government to combat domestic terrorism
without the cloud of constitutional illegitimacy.
228. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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